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youth in Peru 
Julio Cotler* 
Over the past 25 years Peru has undergone a 
substantial change in its suciai structure which has 
stimulated the political radicalization of the working 
classes and of their young people in particular. 
During the 1960s and up to the mid-1970s the 
urban working classes, whose numbers were boosted 
by internal migrations, enjoyed a degree of upward 
mobility accompanied by a much greater increase in 
their expectations of better jobs, incomes, education 
and political participation. However, the somewhat 
closed nature of the political régimes of the time 
blocked the political aspirations of these classes and 
provoked the first wave of radicalization. 
The situation changed from the mid-1970s. On 
the one hand, the continued expansion of education 
fuelled expectations, and the content of education 
fostered radicalization even more. On the other 
hand, economic conditions deteriorated and the 
obstacles to full political participation remained in 
place. In these circumstances, which affect young 
people in particular, violent and inorganic 
confrontation becomes a normal feature of political 
conflicts. 
The author argues that an examination of these 
phenomena, which have taken a particularly intense 
form in Peru, can also be very useful for other 
countries of the region whose political processes 
seem to be headed in the same direction. 
•Consultant tt> ECLAC's Social Development Division. 
Introduction 
It is commonly recognized that in the past 25 
years Peru has undergone major changes in its 
social structure. In explanation or description of 
these changes, reference is usually made to the 
demographic transformation brought about by 
migration and urbanization, to alterations in the 
production and employment structure, which 
have strengthened capitalism and extended it to 
rural areas, and to the expansion of the education 
system and the mass communication media, 
which in conjunction with the earlier processes 
have contributed to a major shift in life styles 
and in the types and levels of social aspiration. 
To all this must be added the striking 
institutional reforms introduced by the former 
military régime which dismantled the 
anachronistic oligarchical system and led to a 
considerable expansion of the functions of the 
State and of its sphere of action. 
It is less common, in this connection, to 
draw attention to the political and cultural 
changes in Peruvian society in this period and, in 
particular, to the change in the political identity 
of the urban working classes in general,1 and of 
their young people in particular. There is varied 
and very clear evidence of the radicalization of 
the working classes and their young people. 
First, there are the results of the election of 
representatives to the Constituent Assembly in 
1978, of the President and members of 
parliament in 1980, and of mayors in 1981 and 
1983. On all these occasions the Leftist 
groupings, which were divided in the first three 
cases and united in the last, won the support of 
about a third of the electorate, an unusual event 
in Latin America. 
Although the analyses of these elections are 
not conclusive, they do indicate a close 
correlation between the working-class vote, 
together with that of the inhabitants of the 
marginal urban districts ("young towns"), and 
1
 The working classes are defined in terms of their jobs; they 
thus include manual workers, non-professional independent 
workers, and white-collar workers without managerial power. 
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the vote of the Marxist groupings of the Left, 
especially in Lima, which contains a third of the 
total electorate. This correlation also seems to 
exist between the urban population and these 
political organizations in the southern 
mountains, the so-called "mancha india" (native 
patch) (Roncagliolo, 1980; Tuesta Soldevilla, 
1983 and 1985). 
The latest general elections, in April 1985, 
in which the APRA and its young candidate won 
an overwhelming victory, followed by the 
candidate of the Izquierda Unida, saw a massive 
shift to the APRA of the working-class, which 
had previously voted for the "traditional" 
parties. Some 80% of the electorate, therefore, 
supported nationalist, popular and democratic 
formulas proposing major changes in the 
country's social and political structure and aimed 
at the nationalization and democratization of 
society and politics. These results have reduced 
the representation of the ruling classes and 
created an unprecedented situation full of hopes 
and fears for the country's future development. 
The second piece of evidence of the 
radicalization of the working classes is the 
apparent consolidation of the General 
Confederation of Workers of Peru, which, 
although indeed controlled by the Comunist 
party, has also seen the development of "class" 
trade unionism in the working-class and public-
employee strata. At the same time, the level of 
demands from the various associations in the 
working-class districts is fuelling the 
mobilization and radicalization of the urban 
working classes as a whole. 
Lastly, the existence since 1980of "Sendero 
Luminoso" and its apparent influence with some 
working-class sectors, despite the military coups 
and the political defeat inflicted by the massive 
turn-out of voters in April 1985, is the clearest 
evidence of the widespread radicalization and 
violence of Peruvian society. 
In this shift towards radicalization of the 
political scene and political identity in Peru, 
which is redefining the working classes, 
working-class youth seems to have played a 
crucial role: it took a decisive part in the 
organization and control of this process from its 
beginnings in the universities, trade unions and 
political parties, in the associations in the 
working-class districts and in Christian 
organizations and centres. This might explain, 
for example, the establishment in the Partido 
Aprista, after the crisis following the death of 
Haya de la Torre, of a new set of leaders who 
managed to reorganize this grouping and go 
over the heads of the old powers established by 
the historical leader. This new generation of 
leaders reformulated the party's policies and its 
relations with society and succeeded in creating a 
new image which produced the popular support 
and the decisive electoral triumph of April 1985. 
Something similar happened in the 
Izquierda Unida, which had been established by 
former university students and working-class 
leaders trained in the vigorous popular 
mobilization against the military régime of the 
past decade. 
Lastly, Sendero Luminoso was certainly 
influential among certain youth sectors and 
played an important role in the recruitment of 
women in these sectors. 
The factors underlying the radicalization 
and the violence of working-class youth and its 
influence on the working classes, especially in 
the towns, are of more than academic interest: 
they affect the lives and human rights of all 
Peruvians. The purpose of the attempt to 
understand these factors, even only tentatively, 
is to find alternative formulas which can channel 
the participation of working-class youth and its 
radicalism towards a popular consensus to form 
the basis of development and democracy in Peru. 
In turn, since the case of Peru seems to be 
an extreme one in the South American sphere, 
this tentative understanding ought to be able to 
make a useful contribution to the consideration 
of the present or potential problems of other 
countries in the region. 
We will first discuss the demographic, 
educational and economic changes of the last two 
decades and their effects on the condition of 
youth, and then these changes will be related to 
the political and cultural experience of the 
working classes and young people during this 
period. 
THE POLITICAL RADICAUZATION OF WORKING-CLASS YOUTH IN PERU / Julio Cotler 109 
I 
Youth and the demographic, educational and 
economic changes 
The demographic changes resulting from 
migration and urbanization in the last two 
decades meant that young people —i.e., people 
aged 15 to 24, according to the common 
convention— increased from 18 to 20% of the 
population between the censuses of 1961 and 
1981. In this same period the numbers of young 
people in the urban areas jumped from 51 to 
70%, while the country's urban population 
increased from 47 to 65%. In addition, whereas 
in 1961 22% of all young people in Peru lived in 
Lima, a prime example of a metropolitan centre, 
that proportion had increased to 31% in 1981. 
Accordingly, while in 1961 the great 
majority of urban youth was of provincial and 
rural origin, 20 years later the majority was made 
up of persons born in the towns: the first urban 
generation. 
In other words, the young population not 
only increased as a relative proportion of the 
country's total population, but also showed a 
considerable increase as a proportion of the 
urban population. Young people could thus take 
a more active part ¡n the country's 
modernization and, accordingly, in the break-up 
of the traditional order. 
This latter assertion is supported, for 
example, by the spectacular changes in the 
educational profile of the population of Peru 
during the last two decades. Firstly, there was a 
sharp increase in literacy among the population 
as a whole and especially among young people, 
both urban and rural. In both cases, the 
population aged 15 to 24 achieved higher levels 
of literacy than the whole of the urban or rural 
population. As is to be expected, the urban 
population has a greater proportion of literates 
than the rural. However, in general terms, the 
differences are not as marked as might be 
expected in view of the well-known 
backwardness of other public services in the 
Peruvian countryside (table 1). 
Table 1 
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Source: National censuses of 1961, 1972 and 1981. 
"Includes persons who did not declare their state of literacy. 
fcTotal population aged 5 and over, except for 1961 when it is 6 and over. 
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Secondly, the change in the educational 
profile can be seen in the differing participation 
at the three educational levels. Here, the 
following points must be made: 
a) There was a sharp decline in the 
numbers of people with no education at all, a 
decline associated with the increase in literacy. 
b) The participation of the total population 
at the primary level increased as a result of the 
inclusion of the rural population in the education 
process. At the same time, there was a decline in 
the participation of the urban population at this 
level, especially in the case of young people, 
which now increased its representation at the 
secondary and higher levels (table 2). 
It is very probable that, as was pointed out 
in another study (Alberti and Cotler, 1977), 
young people from rural origins migrate to the 
towns when they acquire a certain level of 
education no longer in keeping with the degree 
of economic and social development of their 
place of origin. 
c) However, as can be seen from the data in 
tables 3 and 4, the participation of women in the 
education system is still lower than that of men, 
and there are far more urban than rural women 
involved. The dispartity is even greater when 
the education level of urban young women is 
compared with the total female level and with 
the level of young women in the same age group 
in rural areas. 
d) This educational development which, as 
has been seen, is a feature of the young 
population has contributed to the considerable 
expansion of university education. Whereas in 
I960 there were 30 000 university students, 10 
years later there were 109 000 and in 1982 the 
figure had grown to 305 000 (National 
Statistical Institute, 1983). Men made up 63% of 
this total. 
In the majority of the countries of Latin 
America one in 10 young people were at 
university at the beginning of the present decade 
(ECLAC, 1983) but in Peru only 6.8% of young 
people were in higher education; however, in 
Metropolitan Lima the figure was 16.5%. 
Urban and educational conditioning seems 
to have contributed to the great exposure of 
young people, especially in Metropolitan Lima 
and the country's larger towns, to the modern 
communication media, a situation which leads to 
new aspirations and life styles and to new kinds 
of social and political behaviour based on 
growing expectations of social mobility and 
social change. 
In employment terms, 50% of Peru's 
young people held waged jobs in 1972, as either 
manual or white-collar workers. This 
proportion declined in 1981, especially among 
the rural population (table 5), owing to the 
austerity policy pursued during that period. 
In conjunction with the decline in waged 
work among the young population, there was an 
increase ¡n the numbers of independent workers. 
This increase was found both in the towns and in 
the countryside, where independent work had 
always predominated because of the economic 
and social backwardness. The growth in own-
account work among young people is especially 
relevant when it is remembered that, nationally 
and as a proportion of the total employed EAP, 
this category declined slightly between the two 
intercensal periods. 
However, despite the relative decline in the 
proportion of waged young people in the EAP, 
their numbers in the categories of manual and 
white-collar workers remain higher than in the 
EAP as a whole. In fact, as can also be seen in 
table 5, in 1972 50.7% of employed young 
people had this kind of job, as against 44.4% of 
the total EAP; in 1981 the figures were 47.4 and 
43.1 % respectively. It can thus be concluded that 
there is a higher proportion of waged workers 
among young people than in the total EAP. 
For the same reason, and despite the 
increase in independent workers among young 
people, the proportion of these workers remains 
lower than in the total EAP, or in the urban or 
rural EAP. 
Lastly, the proportion of unpaid family 
workers is higher among young people than in 
the total EAP. Although it is an established fact 
that these unpaid workers have an important 
role in producing the family income in the 
working classes, it must be pointed out that in 
rural areas more than a fifth of the total 
population work in the family setting, a 
phenomenon connected with the importance of 
independent workers in the countryside. 
Important changes can be seen in the type 
of activity of young people in Lima, for in the last 
two decades their representation in the 
Table 2 



































































































































1961 1972 1981 
63.0 50.7 32.6 
32.8 45.7 55.9 
1.3 2.8 6.7 
0.1 0.2 0.3 
- 0.1 0.2 
2.8 0.5 4.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: National censuses of 1961, 1972 and 1981. 
"Aged 5 and over, except for 1961 when it is 4 and over. 
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Table 3 






































































Absolute numbers (thousands) 
Source: INE, national census. Unpublished tabulations. 
"Population aged 5 and over. 
Includes normal basic and work. 
Table 4 
PERU: YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24, BY EDUCATION LEVEL AND SEX 































































































Source: INE, 1981 census. Unpublished tabulations, 
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Table 5 
PERU: YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24, BY JOB CATEGORY IN URBAN 




























































































































Source: National censuses of 1961 and 1981. 
"Total employed economically active population aged 6 and over. 
economically active population has declined 
considerably. Whereas in 1961 54 out of every 
100 young people were in the employed EAP, 20 
years later the ratio had declined to 35 in every 
100, a reduction of 18.6%. This change was 
much more marked than the change in the total 
EAP (aged over six) which fell from 44.4 to 
39.1%, a decline of 5.7%. This situation is no 
doubt due to the fact that the expansion of 
education among young people has helped to 
delay their assumption of productive activity. 
In accordance with the pattern observed 
earlier in youth employment at the national 
level» the majority of the young people living in 
Lima are waged (manual, white-collar and 
household), workers while only 10% are 
independent workers (table 6). 
However, the young people of Lima have 
higher rates of total unemployment and 
underemployment than the EAP as a whole. 
Thus , half of the young people are 
underemployed, the majority of them with low 
incomes, in contrast to the situation in the total 
EAP (table 7). 
Where incomes are concerned, the young 
people in the EAP are found mostly at the lowest 
Table 6 
METROPOLITAN UMA: YOUNG PEOPLE 










































Source: Ministry of Labour, 1984 household survey. 
Unpublished tabulations. 
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Table 7 
METROPOLITAN LIMA: EMPLOYMENT 




















Source: Ministry of Labour, 1982 household survey. 
levels. In 1984 in Metropolitan Lima almost half 
of the young people had incomes below or 
roughly equal to the legal minimum wage, but 
this was the case for only 34% of the total of 
Lima's working classes (table 8). However, the 
young migrants had lower incomes than the 
Lima-born residents; almost 60% of them 
earned less than the minimum wage or similar 
amounts, as against 4 0 % of the young people 
born in the city (table 9). 
To sum up, although youth has the highest 
education levels in the population, especially in 
Table 8 
METROPOLITAN LIMA: INCOMES, 1984 
(Percentages) 
15 - 24 Total EAP Incomes 
Young Working-
people class 






















Source: Ministry of Labour, 1984 household survey. 
Unpublished tabulations. 
"Minimum wage at the time of the survey: 195 000 soles. 
Metropolitan Lima, the young people of both 
sexes belonging to the urban working classes 
earn the lowest incomes, despite working the 
longest hours in the most difficult conditions. 
This means that young people of both sexes are 
the most numerous group in the lowest income 
strata of the working classes of Lima (Galín, 
Carrion and Castillo, 1984). 
Table 9 
METROPOUTAN UMA: INCOMES OF YOUNG PEOPLE AGE 15 TO 24, 






































































Source: Ministry of Labour, 1984 household survey. Unpublished tabulations. 
"Minimum wage at ihe time <of the survey: 195 000 soles. 
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II 
The political and cultural experience of the 
working classes and young people 
These contradictory and conflict ing 
characteristics of young people are not exclusive 
to Peru and seem to represent a universal Latin 
American experience (ECLAC, 1983; PREALC, 
1980). However, working-class youth seems to 
play a very decisive role in the political 
development of the working classes and society 
as a whole. 
This first generation with urban and 
educational experience has a high rate of 
participation in the various organizational 
forms which have grown up with the changes in 
the social structure since the "Velasco" period. 
Through this participation young people would 
have been able to gain a sense of integration as a 
generation group and a social class capable of 
overcoming the ethnic and social fragmentation 
of earlier generations, and this would have 
represented a significant advance in national 
integration. Through this participation in 
various bodies and organizations, working-class 
youth has instead developed radicalized and 
violent activities which are decisive in 
determining the social and political attitudes and 
behaviour of the urban working classes. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, a large body of 
working-class young people in Lima, native-
born and migrants, set up households, built their 
homes, established the "marginal" districts in 
which they lived, changing the city's existing 
pattern in the process, and obtained paid work in 
the new production structure which was 
developing. Then, as time passed, a sector of 
them joined the so-called "informal" market, as 
a result of the low wages paid elsewhere, the 
savings made by the domestic unit and also their 
aspiration for social mobility (Gonzales, 1984; 
Verdera, 1985; Herrera, 1985). 
This move gave the embryonic working 
classes a feeling of security and competence in 
their efforts to continue improving their living 
standards, seeing their children as the ones who 
would achieve the longed-for social mobility. As 
they followed this course of action, however, 
these classes, and especially the Andean 
migrants, encountered much difficulty, deceit, 
contempt and violence, mostly on the part of 
employers and government agents (Degregori, 
Blondet and Lynch, 1984). 
In response to these traumatic experiences, 
the new urban working classes took up anew the 
anti-oligarchic struggle started by Haya de la 
Torre and Mariátegui. They learned to organize 
themselves in defence of their homes and their 
districts, their incomes and jobs, and their 
education and health. Moreover, the young 
migrants from the mountains, whose socio-
cultural universe had been thrown out of joint, 
also had to learn to organize themselves in 
ethnic and regional terms, in order to be able to 
adapt to and master the new city conditions, 
defending, strengthening and renewing their 
ethnic identity and resuming the "mancha india" 
tradition of peasant resistance (Golte and 
Adams, 1984). 
This organizational apprenticeship 
marked an important advance in the 
identification of individual and family interests 
with the collective interest, and it influenced the 
development of the self-identity of these 
working classes through opposition to those 
who rejected them. This social innovation 
marked out the course, in a decisive manner, of 
the future political development of these classes 
and thus of the country as well. 
Accordingly, when these mobilized sectors, 
most of them recent arrivals in urban and 
national life, sought to persuade the State to 
recognize their civil rights and thus to allocate 
them their fair share of resources and social 
opportunities, the response was violent 
rejection, humiliation and daily insult. This 
strengthened the perception that "master 
Government" was not only remote and alien to 
them, but also the enemy of the popular classes 
and that it existed only to represent and protect 
the powerful. For this same reason, daily 
experience seemed to suggest to them, quite 
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apart from the community tradition, that the 
power of the State could be fought only through 
the determined organization of working-class 
resistance, and they were strengthened in their 
conviction that only through confrontation 
could they achieve their goals; this was the 
source of the "class" outlook which their 
organizations acquired. 
Against this background, "democracy" was 
seen as nothing more than a fiction, a formality, 
which served only those with access to "power". 
The exclusion of working-class interests from 
representation in the State was a denial of 
political pluralism. In addition, it impeded the 
establishment of legitimate institutional 
mechanisms in which different social actors and 
political bodies could reach compromises leading 
to the redistribution of resources and 
opportunities and fostering the national 
integration of social classes (Cotler, 1981). 
However, against this background, fraught 
with hostility and confrontation, in which the 
popular political culture was marked by violence 
and the rapid break-up of the traditional 
mechanisms of patron-client rule, the working-
class sectors did manage to win ground during 
the 1960s. The political parties had to include 
some of the working-class claims in legislation 
and they passed measures of assistance to ensure 
the continued dependence of the working 
classes. Education, employment and public 
services were expanded, in some cases 
considerably, and this bolstered the organized 
demands of these classes. For example, the 
movements centered on the demand for 
"structural changes" to democratize and 
nationalize society, politics and culture, became 
the axis of the social and political struggle of the 
working classes. 
It was in these circumstances that the 
armed-forces Government made ¡ts revolution, 
designed to respond to the popular demands and 
to usher ¡n the country's economic and social 
modernization. While on the one hand the 
Government brought about a dramatic 
expansion of the social participation of the 
working classes (recognition of trade unions, 
establishment of work communes, educational 
reform, etc.), on the other hand, owing to its 
military outlook, the Government denied the 
possibility of political participation to the 
supposed beneficiaries and presumed objects of 
its reforms (Cotler, 1985). It was around this 
dichotomy —fed by radical talk on the part of the 
Government intellectuals— that a rapid and 
increasing radicalization of working-class 
organizations developed, especially in the towns, 
sealing the birth and destiny of General 
Velasco's revolution. 
Young people played a decisive role in this 
organizational and political development of the 
urban working classes, for it had a particularly 
acute awareness of the situation, and for two 
reasons. Firstly, the expansion of the education 
system to the youth sectors was accompanied by 
radicalization, in the anti-oligarchic tradition, of 
the content of education and of the teaching 
staff. Secondly, a young working class had been 
formed which had a higher level of education 
than the older generations and was concentrated 
in the most dynamic industries and remote from 
the old "Aprista" trade-union tradition. Both 
youth groups, student and worker, promoted and 
directed intense and relatively successful popular 
movements. 
The decision by the leader of the APRA to 
keep his party off the political scene, and by the 
Communist Party to give its "critical support" to 
the military Government created favourable 
conditions for the radical preaching and other 
activities of the many Leftist groups —led by 
young students, professionals and workers, 
many of them the children of migrants— to take 
root in key sectors of society and production, 
creating the "class" current in the trade unions, 
in the popular organizations in the working-
class districts, and in the student and peasant 
federations which were independent of the 
Government. 
It was against this background that General 
Velasco opted for an economic policy of 
distribution and foreign debt. This policy 
marked the beginning of the economic crisis and 
it failed to control the new radicalized currents in 
society. His successor confronted the crisis and 
the new social dynamics by blocking the existing 
forms of participation, many of them developed 
in the previous period, and thus provoked even 
more discontent and opposition. The lack of 
institutional mechanisms for political 
negotiation was exacerbated by the growing 
deterioration in living standards which 
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heightened social and political tensions. This, in 
fact, was the reason for the success of the 
national strikes in 1977 and 1978 which were a 
milestone in the country's modern history and 
consolidated the political radicalism of youth and 
of the working classes in general. 
It can thus be said that from the 1960s arose 
the first wave of youth radical iza tio n, which was 
associated with the social changes initiated in 
that decade and was then catalyzed by the 
political block of the 1970s. The mid-1970s saw 
the emergence of a second wave of youth 
radicalization —superimposed on the first 
one— when the paths of occupational and 
income mobility were being closed off, together 
with those of social organization, and at a time 
when an unprecedented openness was gaining 
ground in politics. 
Although the first radical wave seems to 
have been characterized by a high level of 
institutional participation, on the part of 
working-class youth and by the rationality of the 
demands and the chosen means of action, the 
second, in contrast, blocked economically and 
socially, seems to combine inorganic and violent 
forms of expression —individual and 
collective— with marked electoral preferences 
for the Izquierda Unida and the APRA. 
The opening-up of politics and the 
restoration of the representative system in 1980 
helped to some extent to calm the belligerent 
spirits in society and politics, a fact which the 
Leftists were slow to understand. Belaunde's 
overwhelming victory was part of this process, 
for he displayed a pluralist image, unlike his 
rivals: society saw in him the political 
institutionalization of collective negotiation in 
which there would be a legitimate place for 
working-class representatives and their 
demands for improved living conditions and 
social mobility. The democratic promise of the 
1980s thus seemed to initiate the coming-
together of the State and the working classes. 
However, the Government took a different 
line from the outset: on the one hand, it brought 
in the policy of economic austerity 
recommended by the IMF and, on the other, it 
sought a "social pact" to establish consensus as a 
standard political practice. Nevertheless, the 
contradictions produced by these policies limited 
the possibilities of the "Tripartita". For as the 
crisis worsened, earnings declined; at the same 
time, job losses multiplied and wages fell, while 
casual work and subcontracting increased, as did 
own-account activities. 
On the other hand, the supply of university 
places did not grow in step with the demand, and 
the education and production structures also 
contributed to the tightness of the jobs market, 
which was unable to absorb the young people 
emerging from colleges and universities. This 
led to a general feeling of frustration and 
rejection of the social order and its State 
guarantor. 
In addition, the Government became 
increasingly resistant to the wishes of public 
opinion and to the establishment of machinery 
for negotiation and agreement which might 
have produced consensus formulas. 
Thus, a State ill-disposed towards the 
working classes, and youth sectors which had 
little but aspired to much created a situation in 
which none of these actors was in a position to 
view its interests in collective terms. The "other 
side" seemed to be not a rival but an enemy; 
negotiation was synonymous with surrender, 
betrayal and defeat. In other words, political 
relations were seen in military terms, as a 
continuation of or substitute for war. 
In these circumstances, paradoxically, trade 
unionism declined (Balbi and Parodi, 1984; 
Parodi, 1985), partly as a result of its failure to 
become more representative of the casual 
workers, mainly young people, and it remained a 
body for protection of workers with regular jobs, 
particularly in big companies. This held back the 
numbers of young people from the working 
classes joining trade unions and reduced the 
unions' capacity to act as a rallying point for this 
social group. 
The tack of youth participation in the 
organized levels of the economy and society has 
coincided with the failure of the political parties 
to devise structures capable- of providing 
training, from the organizational and ideological 
standpoint, for the working classes in general 
and their young people in particular. Thus, the 
weakness and inefficiency of the machinery for 
negotiation of the increasing popular and youth 
demands, with respect to society, politics and the 
State, open the way to options of political and 
individual violence. Political violence seems still 
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to stem from the anti-oligarchic tradition which 
supposes that force is the only means of wresting 
from the State the concession of civil rights. 
The radicalization of the urban working 
classes and the decisive role of young people can 
be seen at the lower levels of the Izquierda Unida 
and the APRA, which go much further than the 
stated positions of their leaders. This situation 
has also seen the rise of Sendero Luminoso. The 
steady decline in the living standards of the 
working classes and the manifest ineffectiveness 
of the political system and its parties and of 
"class" trade unionism have been matched by the 
growth of Sendero Luminoso and of its 
importance on the political scene. This 
movement has become a focus of attention anda 
magnet for the urban working classes and, in 
particular, the youth sectors, including those 
active in the Izquierda Unida and the APRA. 
Accordingly, whereas the first wave of 
youth radicalization seems to have led primarily 
to the radicalization of the working classes as a 
whole, the second wave, because of its inorganic 
nature, has remained relatively separate from 
the rest of the working classes and would appear 
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to incline towards Sendero Luminoso. This body, 
by denying the political régime any validity and 
committing acts of unprecedented savagery, 
seems to express a feeling held by large sections 
of working class youth, who see violence as the 
only solution to the obstinacy of a political 
régime dominated by "the old". This trend may 
be an indication of fresh political swings in the 
future and of a series of changes of political 
identity among young people. 
It may therefore be concluded that the 
substantial decline in living standards and the 
denial of any prospect of mobility, added to the 
unwillingness of the political system to build 
institutions capable of producing consensus on 
the distribution of resources and social 
opportunities for the working classes and their 
young people, have accentuated social 
perceptions and attitudes of enmity 
confrontation and harrassment which lead to 
individual and collective violence. This situation 
explains the attraction of any ideology which 
justifies the inevitability of this kind of 
behaviour. 
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